Imagine a scenario where GPS signals suddenly vanish – military operations falter, commercial aviation is grounded, and emergency responders can't locate those in critical need. This alarming possibility underscores a pressing vulnerability faced by the United States due to its overwhelming dependence on GPS technology.
Initially developed by the U.S. Department of Defense in the 1970s, GPS was created to support military operations, including precision-guided weaponry and battlefield navigation. Following the tragic downing of Korean Air Flight 007 by the Soviet Union in 1983, President Ronald Reagan authorized civilian access to GPS, significantly enhancing global aviation safety. Over subsequent decades, GPS has evolved into a cornerstone of both military operations and civilian infrastructure, making its uninterrupted functionality crucial.
Today, virtually every U.S. armed forces jet, naval vessel, missile system, reconnaissance drone, and military logistic operation depends extensively on highly precise satellite-based positioning. Yet, GPS signals are inherently weak and susceptible to disruption from low-cost jamming and spoofing devices employed by adversaries, potentially undermining millions of dollars of advanced military assets and endangering service members' lives at a nominal expense to adversaries. In civilian sectors, interference with GPS signals disrupts critical airline and maritime operations, threatening passenger safety, cargo security, and causing expensive operational delays. Additionally, GPS disruptions significantly impair emergency response capabilities during crises and hinder countless businesses and services reliant on accurate positioning data.
It is imperative for policymakers and national security leaders to recognize and urgently address America's vulnerability due to GPS dependence for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). In an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment, bolstering the resilience and security of PNT infrastructure is essential for safeguarding national security interests and maintaining economic stability.
Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Israel and even non-state actors have exploited GPS interference as a strategic tool to degrade offensive military capabilities. Although these challenges have impacted America’s allies more than ourselves, for the moment, a July 2024 memo from Admiral Thad Allen (USCG; retired), chair of the National Space-based PNT Advisory Board, warned that “America’s continued over-reliance on GPS for PNT makes critical infrastructure and applications vulnerable to a variety of well documented accidental, natural, and malicious threats.”
Fortunately, our AQNav magnetic navigation (MagNav) system addresses some of these threats, offering an unjammable, unspoofable, all-weather, terrain-agnostic, multi-domain alternative to GPS. Currently in testing with the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and recently accepted into NATO’s 2025 Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) cohort for further development, AQNav aligns with the administration’s defense strategy of bolstering resilience in a multi-domain threat environment. However, policy inertia could leave critical military assets vulnerable if immediate steps are not taken to accelerate deployment.
Since its deployment nearly 50 years ago, GPS satellites have become critical infrastructure for the global economy, especially for both the U.S. military and U.S. businesses, and its widespread failure could have a staggering economic impact. According to a 2019 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report, GPS was estimated to have generated more than $1.4 trillion in economic benefits since 1984, including productivity and efficiency gains, lower environmental emissions, improved public health and safety, and more. The same report estimated that total GPS loss in the U.S. could cost over $1 billion per day. Similarly, a 2023 report from the UK Space Agency and Department for Science, Innovation and Technology estimated that country’s losses at more than £1.4 billion per day due to disruptions across aviation, finance, energy grids, and telecommunications. Throughout Europe, the European Commission estimates that by 2029, its Galileo system will generate an estimated €166 billion in revenue from added-value services relying on its technology – all of which could be jeopardized if Galileo is compromised.
Modern transportation networks rely on precise GPS timing and positioning. Disruptions to GPS have already caused commercial aviation incidents, including the fatal Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan on Christmas Day last year, which many believe was due in part to Russian GPS jamming. Earlier this year, a Ryanair flight to Vilnius, Lithuania had to abort its landing and divert to Warsaw, Poland 249 miles away – adding to the more than 800 instances of GPS interference at Vilnius in the last three months of 2024. In the same period in 2023, there were only 124 reported interference incidents.
Similarly in the maritime sector, more than 150 cargo ships traversing the Mediterranean Sea in April 2024 indicated GPS coordinates for airports in Beirut and Cairo. More recently, there were numerous reports of GPS jamming in the Strait of Hormuz lasting several hours, affecting navigation systems and requiring vessels to rely on backup methods.
Beyond transportation, GPS positioning underpins the timing synchronization of power grids, financial markets, and telecommunications networks. If GPS signals were compromised, high-frequency stock trading would falter, ATMs and mobile payments could crash, and power distribution could suffer costly instability. While timing disruptions pose one set of risks, the loss of GPS positioning is equally critical. AQNav, our dual-use MagNav system, addresses this positioning vulnerability – providing a resilient alternative where GPS is denied.
Recognizing these vulnerabilities, Congress has taken bipartisan steps to strengthen PNT resilience. The 2018 National Timing Resilience and Security Act mandated the creation of a backup timing system to GPS, and both Space Policy Directive-7 and Executive Order 13905 call for urgent PNT enhancements. However, the implementation of these mandates has been minimal, and the threat landscape has evolved at a faster pace than policy responses. Relatedly, the U.S. Space Force announced the creation of a separate Resilient Global Positioning System (R-GPS) last September as an alternative to GPS. Fast-tracked under the “Quick Start” authority granted by Congress in last year’s National Defense Authorization Act, three providers are currently drawing up plans.
GPS loss is a critical single point of failure in America’s infrastructure that the new administration must address by accelerating efforts to develop and deploy complementary PNT solutions like AQNav and atomic clock-based timing networks. The UK has already added the loss of PNT capabilities to its National Risk Register and is investing in alternative systems to mitigate the risk. The U.S. must follow suit by incentivizing private-sector innovation, streamlining procurement processes, and ensuring that resilient PNT remains a central component of defense and economic policy.
The disruptions already impacting aviation, maritime trade, and battlefield operations reveal the urgent threat posed by vulnerabilities in GPS infrastructure. America faces a critical and narrowing window to enact essential reforms to safeguard national security and economic stability. Establishing resilient PNT systems – such as MagNav technologies like AQNav – must become an immediate policy priority, before adversaries further exploit this strategic vulnerability.
